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This report presents three studies concerned with learning how to operote o 
simple control panel device, and how this learning is affected by understand- 
ing a device model that describes the internal mechanism of the device. The 
first experiment compared two groups, one of which learned o set of operot- 
ing procedures for the device by rote, and the other learned the device model 
before receiving the identical procedure training. The model group learned 
the procedures foster, retained them more accurately, executed them faster, 
and simplified inefficient procedures far more often, thon the rote group. The 
second study demonstrated that the model group is able to infer the proce- 
dures much mare easily than the rote group, which would lead to more ropid 
learning ond better recall performonce. The third study showed that the im- 
portant content of the device model was the specific configuration of compa- 
nents and controls, and not the motivational aspects, component descriptions, 
or general principles. This specific information is what is logically required to 
infer the procedures. Thus, the benefits of having a device model depend on 
whether it supports direct and simple inference of the exact steps required to 
operate the device. 
This paper is concerned with the role of a mental mode/ in learning how to 
operate an unfamiliar piece of equipment. By “mental model” is meant 
some kind of understanding of how the device works in terms of its internal 
structure and processes (cf. Halasz & Moran, 1983; Norman, 1983). In the 
remainder of this paper, this type of mental model will be termed a device 
model, to distinguish it from the many other senses of the term mental 
mode/, such as that used by Johnson-Laird (1980). 
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of Naval Research, under Contract Number NOOO14-81-C-0499, Contract Authority Identifi- 
cation Number NR157-473. Request for reprints or further information should be sent to 
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Much of the recent discussion of mental models (see Gentner & 
Stevens, 1983) has been mainly concerned with extremely complex physical 
systems, or with behavior in relatively ill-defined tasks, such as describing 
how an electrical circuit works. The emphasis has been on mental models in 
which the understanding of the system approaches the level of understand- 
ing that an actual expert in the relevant technical field would have. For ex- 
ample, considerable attention has been devoted to how people acquire a 
fundamental understanding of electrical circuits (Gentner 8c Gentner, 1983) 
or of a complex shipboard steam propulsion system (Williams, Hollan, & 
Stevens, 1983). However, there have been few empirical studies of mental 
model effects, and many of the results are unclear. Likewise, there has been 
very little study of the role of mental models in interacting with relatively 
simple devices. This domain is not only of great practical importance, but 
also is well suited to experimentation and modelling. 
There are two very strong intuitions about the role of a device model 
in learning how to operate a device, or in being able to operate it once it is 
learned. One, held by most psychologists, is that having such knowledge 
would be of great value; the other intuition, held by the technological in- 
dustries, is that device models are in fact unnecessary (see Bond & Towne, 
1979; Kieras & Polson, 1982, in press), for more discussion). For example, 
the modern telephone system, with its many special options, is extremely 
complex, but the typical telephone book contains only “how-to-do-it” in- 
structions; very few people know how the system works beyond the crudest 
principles. However, almost everybody can successfully operate a telephone. 
Detailed knowledge of how the system works seems to be irrelevant. Another 
example is the instructional material that accompanies word processing 
systems. Some major manufacturers of such systems have apparently 
adopted the policy that instructional material should focus just on “how to 
get the job done,” and should not contain any how-it-works knowledge. 
This judgement is not badly wrong, because many people learn how to 
oeprate these system successfully within a reasonable amount of time. 
For phychologists, the great value of having a device model is intui- 
tively compelling. There are classic results in which a procedure was remem- 
bered better if subjects were taught the underlying principle (e.g., Katona, 
1940; Wertheimer, 195.9). However, recent experimental attempts to 
demonstrate positive effects of teaching subjects a device model for a com- 
puter system have been inconclusive. For example, in learning a text editor, 
nonsignificant results of device model training were observed by Foss, 
Smith, and Rosson (1982) and Alexander (1982). Halasz and Moran (1983), 
using an ordinary calculator, discovered strong positive effects on having a 
device model in some tasks, but not others. Since many of these are null 
results, they have not been published in the archival literature; there are 
probably many more failures to demonstrate such effects. Thus, the role of 
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device models in operating equipment remains very unclear, despite these 
strong intuitions and the importance of the practical questions involved. 
This paper reports three studies. The first is a demonstration that pro- 
viding a device model can result in faster learning and better retention of 
operating procedures. The second demonstrates that the device model can 
be used to infer the operating procedures. The third examines what is the 
critical type of information in the device model materials. For brevity, the 
methods and results have been substantially condensed; for more detail on 
Experiments 1 and 2, refer to Kieras and Bovair (1983), and Kieras (1984) 
for Experiment 3. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Two groups of subjects learned a set of procedures for operating a simple 
control panel device consisting of switches, pushbuttons, and indicator 
lights. The goal of the procedures was to get a certain indicator light to 
flash. The device model group learned some how-it-works knowledge in the 
form of a description of the device based on the familiar television science 
fiction series Sfar Trek. Namely, they were taught that the device was the 
control panel for a “phaser bank” on the “Starship Enterprise,” with the 
flashing light indicating a successful firing of the phaser bank. The internal 
components and processes of the device were explained in terms of this fic- 
titious system. To ensure that the device model manipulation was effective, 
subjects not only studied the model materials, but also had to successfully 
pass a test for knowledge of the model before proceeding to the procedure 
training. The device model materials contained no description of operating 
procedures. 
The rofe group received no model training, but only learned the pro- 
cedures “by rote.” The two groups received exactly the same procedure 
training; this was made possible by referring to the device controls with ab- 
breviations that could be used for both groups. Since a device model should 
enable subjects to operate a device more efficiently, some of the procedures 
were made deliberately inefficient, and the subjects were given the oppor- 
tunity to devise more efficient procedures. After learning the procedures, 
both groups were tested immediately and after one week for retention of the 
procedures. 
Method 
The device and device model. The device consisted of a control panel with a 
toggle switch, a three-position rotary selector switch, two push buttons, and 
four indicator lights. A sketch of the control panel appears in Figure 1. The 
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user had no direct knowledge of the internal state or organization of the 
device; the only aspects of the device that the user was directly aware of was 
the settings of the switches, and whether the indicator lights were on, off, or 
flashing. The simplest way to explain the behavior of the device is to present 
the actual device model that was presented to the subjects. 
Figure 2 is the diagram that was shown to the subjects who learned the 
device model. The toggle switch labelled SP (shipboard power) is the on/off 
switch. If the SP switch is on, the SP indicator lights. The power flows into 
an energy booster (EB), which, if operating correctly and receiving power, 
lights the EB indicator. Power flows out of the energy booster into two 
accuumulators, labelled MA (main accumulator) and SA (secondary ac- 
cumulator). The main accumulator has an indicator which shows that the 
accumulator is receiving energy and functioning properly. The secondary 
accumulator has no such indicator, and its condition is not indicated to the 
user. The rotary switch ESS (energy source selector) selects which accumu- 
lator is to be connected to the PB (phaser bank). If the corresponding push- 
button is pressed, energy flows from the accumulator to the phaser bank. 
When the phaser bank receives the energy, the indicator labelled PFI (phaser 
firing indicator) flashes 4 times at roughly half second intervals, and then 
stops. 
The subjects studied written material along with the diagram. To pro- 
vide an impression of these materials, a sample excerpt appears in Table I; 
the complete materials are in Kieras and Bovair (1983). The key features of 
the device model materials were as follows: It was based on a simple descrip- 
tion of the major components in Figure 2, along with a description of how 
these components related to each other, and how the controls controlled the 
flow of “energy” from one component to another. The training had a small 
amount of discussion of how each of the components worked, mainly em- 
phasizing that they sometimes malfunctioned. It is important to note that 
the materials did not contain any description of procedures to be followed. 
After studying the device model, subjects were given a multiple choice test 
on the model. If they missed any questions, they were required to study the 
material again until all questions were answered correctly. 
The operating procedures. The subjects learned two kinds of procedures 
for operating the device, normal and malfumvion procedures. The two nor- 
mal procedures for operating the device, which were designated simply as 
Procedure I and Procedure 2, correspond to the two different accumula- 
tors. These procedures consisted of the following steps: turn SP switch on; 
set ES selector to MA (or SA); press button FM (or FS); wait until PF indi- 
cator finishes flashing; set ES selector to N; turn SP off. After learning 
these two normal procedures, the subjects were then told that sometimes the 
device malfunctioned, and depending on the situation, it could be made to 
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TABLE I 
Sample of the Device Model Instructions for Experiment 1 
The energy booster takes in power from the ship and boosts it to the level necessary to fire 
the phasers. Power that has been boosted by the energy booster is fed into the two accumu- 
lators. Both accumulators store large amounts of power ready to be discharged to the 
phoser bank whenever the phasers are fired. 
Because the accumulators handle such large omounts of power, if they are used contin- 
uously they are liable to overload and burn out. To prevent continuous use of one accumula- 
tor, this system has two: the main accumulator (MA) and the secondary accumulator (SA). 
The power coming in from the shipboard circuits is controlled by the ship’s power switch 
(SP). When this switch is off, no power is being drawn from the ship. When the switch is 
turned on, power is drawn from the ship into the energy booster. The boosted power is then 
fed into the accumulators. The accumulator whose energy will be discharged to the phaser 
banks is selected by the energy source selector (ES). While the ES selector is set to neutral 
(N), no energy con be discharged from either accumulator to the phaser bank. 
situations were of two types; in one type, the PF indicator could be made to 
flash by means of an alternate procedure, such as using the SA setting in- 
stead of the MA. In the other type, the PF indicator could not be made to 
flash, and the subject was to follow a procedure to indicate that an irrecover- 
able malfunction has occurred. This consisted of typing the letter “E” on 
the terminal keyboard, and then “shutting down” by setting the ES selector 
to N and turning the SP switch off. For each normal procedure, four differ- 
ent malfunction situations were defined. This gave a total of 10 procedures 
for the subject to learn. The last step in each procedure consisted af typing 
the letter “F” for “finished.” 
Four of the procedures were designed to be inefficient. In these pro- 
cedures, the subject was trained to follow the complete normal procedure 
up to the point where the PF indicator was supposed to flash. However, it 
was possible to tell from the indicators, as soon as the power was turned on, 
whether the desired procedure would work at all, and steps could then be 
immediately taken to either try the other accumulator, or to simply shut 
down the system. By including such procedures, it was possible to determine 
whether subjects would be able to simplify, or “short-cut,” the instructed 
procedures. 
Apparatus. The device itself was simulated by means of a laboratory com- 
puter which monitored the settings of the switches and push buttons and 
controlled the indicator lights accordingly. AI1 instructions and commands 
to the subjects were presented on a standard video terminal positioned next 
to the device. A computer-assisted instruction program was used to present 
the device model training, the procedure training, and the tests for retention 
of procedures. The subject was seated in a small room at at table with the 
terminal and the control panel, and was observed by means of closed-circuit 
television. 
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Procedure. The device model group and the rote group received exactly the 
same procedure training. Both groups were familiarized with the location 
and labels of the controls at the beginning of the experiment. The only dif- 
ference between the two groups were that the device model group received 
the device model instruction at the beginning of the experiment, and a small 
amount of additional device model instruction, before starting to learn the 
malfunction procedures, and had the diagram (Figure 2) posted on the wall 
in front of them throughout training, but not during retention testing. 
The process of training each procedure was a serial anticipation teach- 
ing phase alternating with a test phase. After performing the last step in the 
teaching phase, the subject entered the test phase and attempted to execute 
the procedure from memory. If the entire procedure was performed cor- 
rectly, another test trial was begun. If three correct trials in a row were per- 
formed, the subject then moved on to the next procedure. If an incorrect 
step was made, the subject was immediately informed, and then began the 
teaching phase again. 
After learning all 10 procedures, the subject performed three retention 
tests. In each test, a command to perform either Procedure 1 or Procedure 2 
would appear on the subject’s terminal, and he or she would then attempt to 
perform the designated procedure. On half of the 16 trials, a normal situa- 
tion was the case, so the normal procedure would work; on the other half, 
there was some malfunction situation, and the subject had to perform the 
appropriate malfunction procedure. No feedback was given during the 
tests. The data recorded were which control was operated on each step of 
the subject’s procedure, and the corresponding response latency. Test 1 was 
given immediately after completing the procedure learning, with subjects 
being instructed to perform the procedures exactly as they had learned 
them. After completing the first test, the subject performed Test 2, which 
was identical to the first test, but they were instructed to try to short-cut or 
simplify the procedures if possible. Following the second test, the subject 
was sent home, with instructions to return in one week for Test 3, which was 
the same test, but with no particular instructions given with regard to short- 
cuts. 
Subjects. The 40 subjects, 20 in each group, were recruited through campus 
advertisements and they were paid $5 for each session. Subjects were ran- 
domly assigned to either model or rote group so that there were always ap- 
proximately equal numbers of subjects in each group. Subjects were balanced 
by sex so that there were an equal number of males and females in each 
group. Three of the subjects did not return for their second session, result- 
ing in 19 subjects in the rote condition and 18 in the model condition. A one 
week delay was intended, but, due to scheduling problems, two subjects re- 
turned ten days after the first session, while 4 returned eight days later. 
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Results 
For reasons of brevity, differences between procedures will be ignored. 
While there are many detailed procedure-specific aspects of the results, the 
major thrust of the results is not affected by ignoring the procedures factor. 
Table II presents a summary of the effects of the device model manip- 
ulation. All effects reported here are statistically significant at or beyond the 
.05 level, using appropriate tests. Subjects in the model group took an aver- 
age of 1141 s to learn the device model; this time included reading the train- 
ing material and performing the quiz to the criterion of all questions 
answered correctly. Subjects in the model group learned a procedure faster 
than the rote subjects, by an average of 76 s, a 28% improvement. The 
retention test performance was higher for the model group. Note that the 
model group executed a correct (in terms of achieving the final goal) proce- 
dure 19% more often over all three tests; however, this improvement was a 
modest 11% for the l-week delayed test considered separately. Especially 
noteworthy is the strong difference in the number of short-cut procedures 
used when it was possible. The model group uses these efficient procedures 
far more often than the rote group. Finally, the model group executed the 
procedures 17% faster during the tests than the rote group, even when, as 
shown in the table, only the exact reproduction of the instructed procedures 
is considered. 
TABLE II 
Summary of Results on Leorning Procedures With and Without a Device Model 
Group 
Rote Model lrnprovement 
Mean Device Model Training Time (s) 
Mean Procedure Troining Time (s.) 
Mean Correct Procedure Retention (over all tnstsj 
Mean Correct Retention After 1 Week 
Proportion of “short-cuts” (more efficient 
procedures done when possible) 
___ 1141 ___ 
2’10 194 20% 
67% 00% 19% 
71% 70% 1 1% 
0% 40% 400% 
Mean execution time of retained instructed 
arocedures (s.) 
20.1 16.8 17% 
Discussion 
Note that no attempt was made to optimize the device model materials. 
Nonetheless, over the entire procedure training on the 10 procedures, model 
subjects were an average of about 760 s faster than rote subjects, which 
compares favorably with the average 1141 s that it took subjects to learn the 
device model. Thus, in roughly similar total training times, the model group 
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remembered instructed procedures more accurately, used more efficient 
procedures much more often, and executed the procedures faster than the 
rote group. 
This experiment shows that having a device model does improve per- 
formance on learning and retaining the operating procedures for a device. 
This result is significant, because it has been hard to demonstrate that such 
effects do exist. However, the question is how knowledge of the device 
model produces these effects. They are similar to those which have been ob- 
tained in a variety of learning situations in which the more “meaningful” 
the material is, the faster it is learned and the better it is retained. However, 
to say that the device model makes the device more “meaningful” does not 
actually explain how this extra descriptive information makes the proce- 
dural information easier to learn and remember. 
The specific hypothesis offered here is that knowledge of how a 
system works helps by enabling the user to infer how to operate the device. 
It is an old and established principle of learning that learning and memory 
will be facilitated if the learner can reconstruct the to-be-remembered infor- 
mation. Perhaps the device model simply allows the model group subjects 
to reconstruct by means of inference the operating procedures even if spe- 
cific details of the direct memory of them have been forgotten. This provides 
a specific explanation for how making a device “meaningful” with a device 
model can allow the procedures to be learned and remembered better. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
An obvious implication of the above hypothesis is that, if subjects are asked 
to infer procedures, rather than learn them, the model group subjects 
should have a decided advantage. Experiment 2 tested this implication by 
using two groups as before, in which one learned the device model and the 
other did not, but they were asked to infer the procedures while “thinking 
out loud.” It was expected that the subjects with the device model would be 
able to infer the procedures quite readily, and that the think-aloud protocol 
data would show that they were basing their inferences on the device model. 
In contrast, the rote group would be forced to rely on very general aspects 
of how one operates equipment, such as the fact that it has to be turned on, 
and would follow some kind of trial and error approach to discovering the 
opening procedures. 
Method 
Subjecfs. Subjects were sampled from the same pool as in Experiment 1, 
and were paid $5. Subjects were run individually, being assigned to their 
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conditions at random. Since this was a protocol-collection experiment, only 
five subjects wre run in each group. 
Instructions and procedure. The equipment and device model training were 
the same as for Experiment 1. The instructions for the procedure inference 
task told rote subjects that the goal of operating the device was to make the 
PF indicator flash, and that they should discover the control settings that 
make this happen. They were asked to “think aloud” about their guesses, 
hypotheses, and the knowledge they were using. After they had found set- 
tings that would make the PFindicator flash, they were asked to develop a 
procedure with as few steps as possible, and then go on to find a second way 
to make the PF indicator flash. Instructions to the model subjects were 
similar, except that they were told that the goal was to make the phasers 
fire. The model subjects had the device diagram displayed about the device 
throughout the whole experiment. 
After subjects had read the instructions on the terminal, the procedure 
inference task was begun, with all statements and activities of the subject 
recorded on videotape; the lab computer recorded each change of the con- 
trols on the device. The experimenter prompted the subjects with questions 
if necessary to encourage “thinking out loud.” The subjects inferred the 
procedures in two phases; the first considered of inferring the two normal 
situation procedures; the second phase consisted of inferring the malfunc- 
tion situation procedures. Subjects were given two or three passes through 
all situations, in order to allow them to arrive at a stable procedure for each 
situation. The experimenter judged whether the subject’s procedure was 
stable on the basis of correct performance, consistent control settings, and 
lack of hesitation. 
Results 
The basic measure of how easy it was to infer a procedure is the number of 
actions, defined as a change in control settings, tried before arriving at the 
appropriate goal state. The number of actions tried averaged over all 10 
procedures for each attempt is shown in Table III. Both groups ended up 
with the same optimal procedures, but the rote group tried a very large 
number of actions in their first attempt. In contrast, almost all of the model 
subjects deduced the correct procedures almost completely correctly on 
their first attempt. These effects are significant at or beyond the .05 level. 
The protocol data will be described very briefly. There was essentially 
no overlap in the protocol content between the two groups. The model 
group explained their actions and the device behavior almost completely in 
terms of the model. The rote group tended to follow a systematic trial and 
error strategy, and explained the device in terms of superficial relations be- 
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TABLE III 














tween the indicators or control labels. Especially interesting is that the rote 
subjects made many more statements that expressed negative affect or that 
the experiment was “rigged” in some way. 
Discussion 
Having the device mode1 available while inferring the procedures for 
operating the device produced very powerful differences in the performance 
of the subjects and in the protocol data. The group with the device model 
inferred the procedures for operating the device in almost the fewest trial 
actions possible. As reported in detail in Kieras and Bovair (1983), they also 
engaged in very few “nonsense” trial actions, making only attempts that 
were consistent with the device model. One of the few cases where this was 
not so is one mode1 group subject who made a couple of extraneous actions 
while discovering the first procedure. This subject tried to fire the phasers 
without first powering up the system, saying as he did so that he wanted to 
see if the accumulators still had a stored charge that could be used to fire the 
phaser. Thus, even when a model subject did not perform optimally, he did 
so on the basis of reasonable inferences from the device model. Clearly, the 
device model provided a basis for inferring the procedures. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest very strongly that the facilitation ob- 
served in Experiment 1 was due to the model subjects being able to infer the 
procedures. However, the device mode1 material contained many different 
types of information. It placed the device in an interesting and familiar fan- 
tasy context, which may have been more motivating than the rote condition. 
It also provided some genera1 principles and design rationale information, 
such as why an energy booster is necessary. Finally, the device model con- 
tained information on the sysfern fopology (what is connected to what), and 
made use of the principle of power flow, in which power starts at a source 
and is routed through controls and components to a destination. 
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An analysis in the form of a computer stimulation (described in Kieras, 
1984) suggests that it is the system topology together with the power flow 
concept that makes inference of the procedures possible. But this is true 
only if the topology information describes specifically which controls are on 
what power-flow paths. Thus, the critical how-it-works information is the 
specific descriptions of the controls and their path relations to the internal 
components. Therefore, neither the fantasy context, nor details about the 
nature of the components, nor general principles about how the system 
works, should be of value in enabling subjects to infer the procedures. This 
set of assertions was tested in Experiment 3, which was also designed to 
collect detailed inter-response times during procedure inference. This time 
data is discussed in Kieras (1984). 
Method 
Materials and Design. The experiment was a 2 x 2 factorial design, with the 
factors being the presence or absence of the fantasy context and the presence 
or absence of specific control information. The no-fantasy no-specific con- 
dition was identical to the previous rote condition, and the fantasy specific 
condition was essentially the same as the previous model condition. A sam- 
ple excerpt of the fantasy-specific materials is shown in Table IV. The changes 
from Table I materials are concerned only with ensuring that subjects refer 
to the diagram (a problem in Experiments 1 and 2) and changes in abbrevia- 
tions to accomodate the other conditions more easily. The same diagram 
was used as in Experiment 1, with changes only in the abbreviations for the 
controls. 
The no-fantasy specific condition subjects studied device model mate- 
rials identical to the previous materials, except that all references to the Star 
Trek fantasy were eliminated, along with any discussion of how the system 
components worked or why they were present. The names of the compo- 
nents were changed to terms that did not convey any particular function for 
the system, such as pulser instead of phaser bank. Table V contains a sample 
of these materials that corresponds to Table IV. These subjects studied the 
same diagram as the fantasy-specific group, with appropriate changes in the 
labels. 
The fantasy no-specific materials consisted of a fantasy explanation 
of the pseudo-physics principles underlying the phaser system, along with 
the major components and general power flow, but without describing any 
of the controls, indicators, or actual power-flow paths. This material was 
similar in length to the other device model materials, and was also accom- 
panied by a diagram. The diagram is shown in Figure 3, and a sample of the 
materials in Table VI. As in the other device model conditions, subjects had 
TABLE IV 
Sample of Materials for the Fantasy Specific Condition 
The arrows an the diagram show how power flows through the system. Starting on the 
lower left of the diagram, you can see that power comes in from the shipboard circuits. 
Notice on the diagrom that this power flows to the energy Booster (6). and from there it 
flows to the two accumulators (MA and SA). The diagram shows that power can flow from 
either of the accumulators to the Phaser bank (P). The switch, selector and pushbuttons 
control the flow of power. 
I will first describe the function of each component, ond then will describe how the controls 
relate to the components. 
Ship’s power cannot be used to fire the phaser directly because it is not ot a high enough 
level. The energy Booster boosts the ship’s power to the high level necessary to fire the 
phoser. Both accumulators store large amounts of power, ond if they ore used continuously, 
they are liable to overload and burn out. To prevent continuous use of one accumulator, this 
system has two: the Moin Accumulator (MA) and the Secondary Accumulator (SA). When 
the Phaser bank receives power, rapid phose shifts toke place. These phase shifts cause the 
emission of the phoser beoms, and thus the actual firing. 
Now that you have seen what each component does, I will describe how the controls relate 
to the operotion of the components. 
On the lower left of the diagram, locate the ship’s Power Switch (PS). You can see that the 
power coming in from the shipboard circuits is controlled by the PS switch. When this switch 
is off, no power con come in. When the switch is turned on, power flows into the energy 
Booster (8). Power from the energy Booster then flaws into both accumulators. Find the 
selector on the diagram and notice that the accumulator whose power will be supplied to 
the Phoser bank is selected by the selector (S). While the selector is set to neutral (N), no 
power con flow from either accumulator to the Phaser bank. When the selector is set to MA, 
the power can flow from the Moin Accumulator. When the selector is set to SA. then power 
can flow from the Secondary Accumulator. 
TABLE V 
Sample of Materials for the Specific No-Fantasy Condition 
The arrows on the diagram show how power flows through the system. Starting on the 
lower left of the diagrom, you can see that power comes in from the power source. Notice 
on the diagram how this power flows to the Buffer (6). and from there it flows to the two oc- 
tivators (MA ond SA). The diagram shows that power can flow from either of the activators 
to the Pulser (P). The switch, selector, and pushbuttons control the flow of power. 
I will now describe how the controls relate to the components. 
On the lower left of tlie di$ram, locate the power switch (PS). You con see that the power 
coming in from the power source is controlled by the PS switch. When this switch is off, no 
power can come in. Wheh the switch is turned on, power flows into the Buffer (19). Power 
from the Buffer then flows into both octivatars. Find the selector an the diagram, and notice 
thot the activator whose power will be supplied to the Pulser (P) is selected by the selector 
(S). While the S selector is set to neutral (N), no power cdn flow from either activator to the 
Pulser (P). When the selector is set to MA, the power can flow from the Main Activator. 
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to pass a test on the content before proceeding to the rest of the experiment. 
Complete copies of the materials appear in Kieras (1984). 
Subjects. Subjects were recruited and paid as in the previous experiments. 
Since it was desired to collect timing data for the two specific information 
groups, 10 subjects were run in these conditions, and 5 in the other two. 
Rocedures. This experiment used a simpler procedure than Experiment 2. 
Subjects made only one attempt to infer how to operate the device in each 
situation, and the normal and malfunction situations were not distinguished 
to the subject. All 10 situations were given to each subject. After completing 
each situation, the subject was prompted for a retrospective report; how- 
ever, these data will not be reported. 
TABLE VI 
Sample of Moteriols for the Fantasy with no Specific Information Condition 
The phaser system is based on several important principles in physics that were discovered 
in the last decade of the 20th century. These were applied to produce o powerful weapon 
system for use aboord interstellar spaceships. Such a system became necessary to defend 
Federation ships from the aggression of the sophisticated warships of the hostile Klingon 
and Romuion empires. 
The key characteristics of the phaser system is its need for very high energy levels thot ore 
available on short notice. The basic energy source is the violent interaction of matter and 
antimatter, which is controlled by means of a catalytic plasma produced from ionized dilith- 
ium crystals. Find the matter-antimatter power source on the diagram. The normal result of 
contact between matter and anti-matter is o violent explosion. However, the catalytic 
plasma slows the rate ot which energy is released, so that use of this energy becomes 
practical. 
The phoser requires energy of several giga-electron volts to be applied within a few pico- 
seconds. Not even the dilithium-based matter-antimatter system can generate such peak 
levels, and so the energy that it does produce must be stored. The storage system is an out- 
growth of the first successful unified field theory. A circulating field, known as an energon 
ring, can be collapsed by the injection of large amounts of energy from the matter-anti- 
matter powor source. The extent of the collapse is determined by the amount of energy in- 
iected. Find the matter-antimatter power source on the diagram. and notice the arrows that 
show the flow of power into the energon storage system. 
Maintenance of a collapsed energon ring requires a supply of vector bosons which is syn- 
chronized with the period of energon circulation. When the energon ring is allowed to ex- 
pand, all of the energy is released almost instantaneously, with a maximum release time of 
35 picoseconds. Because the energy must be taken out of the energon ring within picosec- 
onds, the energon storage system must be able to operate at very high speeds. By making 
the energon storage system as compact as possible, the time needed for energy to travel 
between components of the system is minimized. This need for compactness was a major 
factor that led to adoption of a toroidal (doughnut-shaped) vessel in which the energon 
rings circulate. On the diagram, find the energon storage system. You will see the toroidol 
storage vessel shown with the energon rings circulating inside. Notice that the boson gen- 
erators are mounted around the outside of the vessel. 
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Results 
The number of actions tried was counted as in Experiment 2. Table VII shows 
the mean number of actions tried by each group, averaged over situations. 
There is a strong main effect of specific information @ < .Ol), while the ef- 
fect of the fantasy context and the interaction failed to reach significance 
(ps> .l). 
Discussion 
These results show that the effectiveness of the device model instructions in 
the first two experiments was not due to either the motivational interest of 
the fantasy, nor to the how-it-works information about the system com- 
ponents, nor to the general principles underlying the system. Rather, the 
critical how-it-works information is the specific items of system topology 
that relate the controls to the components and to the possible paths of 
power flow. The stimulation model in Kieras (1984) makes use of exactly 
this information and is able to infer the procedures for operating devices of 
this type in a simple and general way. 
TABLE VII 
Mean Number of Actions Tried While Inferring Procedures 
Specific lnformotlon 
Condltlon No Fontosy 
Fontosy Condition 
Fontosy Mean 
No Specific Information 24.3 17.7 21 .o 
Specific Information 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Mean 12.3 10.1 11.2 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of these three experiments not only show that device model in- 
formation can have definite and strong facilitative effects, but also show 
how it does, and what kind of information is critical for an effective device 
model for this type of device. The earlier attempts to demonstrate effects 
may have been inconclusive because the wrong choice of task or model in- 
formation would produce no effects. Furthermore, the explanation that the 
task becomes more “meaningful” as a result of having a device model can 
be replaced with a more specific explanation, that the device model helps 
because it makes possible specific inferences about what the operating pro- 
cedures must be. 
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Thus, the basic principle advanced here is that, in the context of learn- 
ing procedures for a device, the useful how-it-works knowledge is the 
knowledge about the internal workings of the system that allows the user to 
infer exactly how to operate the device. If this definition of what constitutes 
a useful device model is adopted, several practical suggestions can be of- 
fered for when, and what kind of, device model information should be 
taught to users of a device: 
1. The device model information must support inferences about the 
exact and specific control actions. Thus, for example, teaching 
users general principles, metaphors, or analogies will be of little 
value, since these are unlikely to support such precise inferences 
(cf. Halasz & Moran, 1982). 
The relevant how-it-works knowledge can be very superficial and 
incomplete, because the user does not need to have a full under- 
standing of the system in order to be able to infer the procedures 
for operating it. 
Teaching a device model will not always be of value; it depends on 
whether the user in the actual task situation both needs to infer the 
procedures, and also needs the supplied information in order to be 
able to infer the procedures. If the device is very simple, or the pro- 
cedure is easily learned and practiced, there in fact may be no need 
for providing a device model. Also, for some devices, users may be 
able to easily infer a usable device model without explicit instruc- 
tion. The ordinary telephone is a good example of a device for 
which supplying a device model is apparently unnecessary. 
4. Learning and using a device model may have its own pitfalls. That 
is, knowledge of the model may be subject to misunderstandings 
and distortions, like any other knowledge. Thus if the user is 
taught a device model, but fails to learn it correctly, incorrect in- 
ferences will be made, and performance may not be facilitated at 
all, or may actually be impaired (see Kieras & Bovair, 1983; Polson, 
Kieras, Englebeck, & Willer, 1983). 
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